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Presidential Predictions of Supreme Court
Justices' Behavior
ROGER

HANDBERG

University of Central Fwrida
With the retirement of Justice Douglas, President Ford was confronted
with the dilemma of choice. Amid speculation over whether a female
would be appointed to the Court, the President had to bear in mind the
necessity of choosing a person who would hold policy views comp atible
with those of the President. Obviously, presidents have in their Supreme
Court appointments the opportunity to affect future policy choices long
after their administration has ended. Justice Douglas' retiremen t graphically demonstrated this fact since his tenure covered thirty six yearsthirty of those since the end of President Roosevelt's administr ation.
Therefore, the choice is both more important and more difficult than
other presidential appointments. The importance lies with th e Court's
ability to veto policies but even more importantly to shape the terms of
the political debate. The difficulty exists in that you are pro jecting into
an unknown future with an appointee you can not :fire if the results are
contrary to your expectations. 1
Henry Abraham has overviewed the entire historical pr ocess in his
work Justices and Presidents with the explicit purpose of evaluating
whether particular justices met the expectations of the appointing president. 2 The record was found to be generally mixed primarily beca use of
other factors such as friendship, lobbying campaigns, political expediency, and presidential inattention diluted the concern with p olicy views
( at least explicit concern). One difficulty in evaluating judicial performance though is that the evidence tends to be relatively impressio nistic.8
An alternative approach that exists for evaluating relative judici al behavior is presented by the materials in Schubert's The Judicial Mind Revisited.4 As a result of this analysis of voting behavior, a series of ideo1 Robert Scigliano has an excellent discussion of the process and its inheren t difficulties. See The Supreme Court and the Presidency (New York: The Free Press,
1971), Ch. 4 and 5. For lower federal courts, see Harold W. Chase, Federal Judges:
The Appointing Process ( Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1972) .
2 Henry J. Abraham, Justices and Presidents (New York: Penguin Books, Inc.,
1975), Ch. 3.
3 Dennis Thompson, "The Kennedy Court: Left and Right of Center," 26 West ern Political, Quarterly ( 1973), 263-279.
4 Glendon Schubert, The Judicial Mind Revisited (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1974).
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gical types have been generated within which each justice is placed
on that individual's performance upon the Court. The empirical types
~cientilied break the Justices down into two broad groupings of liberals
~d conservatives wi~ several subsets within each grouping. The placements were extended mto the Burger Court although the data base was
less complete. 11 Table 1 presents the placements as abstracted from The
Judicial Mind Revisited.
10
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TABLEI. Scale Vector Types

Ecolib

Modern
Lib
Black
Douglas
Murphy
Rutledge
Warren

Polib
Brennan
Fortas
Goldberg
Marshall

Econs
Frankfurter
Jackson
Stewart
Powell

Modern
Cons
Burton
Harlan
Whittaker
Burger
Rehnquist

Peons

Clark
Minton
Reed
Vinson
White
Blackmun

0 Material abstracted from Table 5.4, The Judicial Mind Revisited, p. 86-87.
ECOLIB-economic liberalism
MODERN LIB-modem liberalism
POLIB--political liberalism
ECONS-economic conservatism
MODERN CONS-modem conservatism
PCONS-political conservatism

The question then becomes one of determining what expectations the
president had when appointing the particular justice. The difficulty which
becomes readily apparent is that the evidence is so sketchy and oft selfserving that one is left at a loss as to what the "real" motivation was in
a particular instance. 6 Therefore, the level of analysis here shifts from
the particular to the general: what was the general domestic policy orientation of the appointing president: i.e. liberal or conservative. Analysis at this level obviously ignores certain affective elements in the appointment process but those can be conceptualized as explanations for
failure to predict judicial performance successfully. Based on this procedure, the appointing presidential administrations were classified generally as either liberal (Roosevelt, Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson) or
conservative (Eisenhower and Nixon). Table 2 presents a breakdown of
appointments by administration.
11Ibid.,

88-89.
David J. Danelski, A Supreme Court Justice Is Appointed (New York: Random House, 1964), Ch. 6-8.
6
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TABLE 2. Justice Ideology

Administration:
Liberal
Roosevelt . . . . . . . . 4 Black, Douglas,
Murphy, Rutledge
Truman .........
0
Eisenhower ......

2 Warren , Brennan

Kennedy . . . . . . . . 1 Goldberg
Johnson . . . . . . . . . 2 Fortas, Marshall
Nixon . .
0

Conservative
3 Frankfurter, Jackson,
Reed
4 Burton, Vinson,
Clark , Minton
3 Harlan , Whittaker,
Stewart
White
1
0
4 Burger, Blaclanun,
Powell, Rehnquis t

9

15
What is clear is that the liberal presidents have had the greatest difficulty in successfully predicting judicial performance ( 8 of 15 unsucce ssful predictions) in terms of the appointee's liberalism/ conservatism. The
two conservative presidents were much more successful ( 7 / 9 successful
predictions). The two unsuccessful predictions by President Eisenhowe r
occurred for somewhat similar reasons: i.e. political expediency. Chief
Justice Warren was an apparent implicit political payoff for past party
support while Justice Brennan's appointment was linked to presidenti al
electoral calculations. Brennan was selected during the 1956 presiden tial
campaign in an attempt to solidify Eastern Catholic support for Eisenhower. 7
The failure of the liberal presidents to successfully predict is prim arily
a function of friendship and historical change. Both Kennedy and especially Truman selected individuals on the basis of personal friends hip
ties-a factor which in effect negated pure policy or ideological considerations. Franklin Roosevelt's apparent inability to select congruent appointees is a function of the changed environment within which the
appointees found themselves after the New Deal was constitutiona lly
triumphant. Justice Jackson for example underwent a dramatic chang e
in behavior after his experiences at the Nuremberg Trials. 8 Justices Reed
and Frankfurter were ardent New Dealers initially but by 1946 ( when
Schubert's analysis begins) had shifted to the more moderate and conAbraham, 236-237 and 245-246.
Glendon Schubert, "Jackson's Judicial Philosophy: An Exploration in Value
Analysis," 59 American Political Science Review ( 1965) 940-963.
7
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ervative positions which characterized both until retirement. 9 Both were
~ effect overtaken by events. President Truman's apparent failure to select apparent liberals is in part an artifact of the categories given the
dichotomy that existed between the administration's liberal social-economic programs and its hardline repressive position on subversives. Justice Clark represents the best example of the dichotomy in his relative
economic liberalism with a strong position in favor of government authority to repress dissidents and punish criminals.
The general thrust of this short note is that presidential predictions of
supreme court appointees' future behavior is very accurate over the short
run. One must remember that the individuals selected normally have had
extensive and varied professional careers which usually establish a clear
ideological pattern. Inability to predict is a function of other extraneous
( though important) variables entering the selection process such as
friendship ties or political expediency. Where the president is not diverted by such considerations-the predictions are very successful. When
you consider the appointments within the first five years-there were no
wrong predictions except for when the other variables intervened. In
fact, the most successful ( and obvious) examples of prediction are President Eisenhower after the 1956 election and President Nixon in his announced campaign to restructure the Court. 10 Unfortunately for the presidents, politics and friends exist so that ideological proclivities are an
important consideration but need not be the dominant one.
9 This shift was documented earlier by C. Herman Pritchett in The Roosevelt
Court as he traced the shift of Frankfurter especially but also Reed and Jackson to
more conservative position on the Court relative to the other Roosevelt appointees.
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948), Ch. 9 and 10.
10 Abraham, Ch. 1.

